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(1) 
“WHOSE” GAME IS IT?  SPORTS-WAGERING AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
RYAN M. RODENBERG, ANASTASIOS KABURAKIS & JOHN T. HOLDEN* 
N 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
(PASPA), a statute designed to prevent the further spread of state-sponsored 
sports-wagering.1  The statute’s language has the effect of granting a property 
right to sports leagues, implicating the Constitution’s Intellectual Property 
Clause.2  The Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress the authority: “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”3 
In 2012, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League 
(NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey 
League (NHL), and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
(collectively “Sports Leagues”) brought suit against New Jersey Governor Chris 
Christie seeking an injunction under PASPA to prevent the state from offering 
regulated sports-wagering.4  The Department of Justice (DOJ) eventually joined 
the Sports Leagues as an intervenor.5  The matter was eventually appealed to 
the Third Circuit where a divided court ruled 2–1 in favor of the Sports 
Leagues.6 
PASPA’s section 3703—labeled “Injunctions”—includes the word 
“whose,” which confers the ownership rights of “competitive game[s]” to the 
Sports Leagues for enforcement purposes under the statute: 
A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be commenced 
in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney 
General of the United States, or by a professional sports organization 
or amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to 
 
 *  Rodenberg is an assistant professor at Florida State University.  Kaburakis is an 
assistant professor at Saint Louis University.  Holden is a doctoral student at Florida State 
University.  This Article is based on a portion of the certiorari stage amici curiae brief 
submitted by the authors.  See Brief for Amici Curiae Ryan M. Rodenberg, Anastasios 
Kaburakis, and John T. Holden in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari, Christie v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1246719. 
1.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).  In 1999, the Supreme Court discussed PASPA 
briefly in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179–
80 (1999). 
2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04. 
3.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
4.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 2:12-cv-04947), 2012 WL 3191255. 
5.  See David Purdum, Feds to Step in on New Jersey’s Effort to Legalize Sports 
Betting, THE SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://linemakers.sportingnews.com/sport/2013
-01-22/new-jersey-nj-sport-betting-law-dept-of-justice-doj-intervenes-chris-christie. 
6.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
I 
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be the basis of such violation.7 
This semantic choice, with the determinant word “whose,” confers ownership 
rights of “competitive game[s]” to the Sports Leagues, as well as other 
professional or amateur sports organizations, deputizing them to enforce the law 
in the same manner as the DOJ.8  As a pronoun, the word “whose” is the 
possessive form of the word “who” and is used as an adjective.  The word 
“whose” is defined as “a possessor” and “that which belongs to whom.”9 
PASPA violates the Intellectual Property Clause for two distinct reasons.  
First, the express grant of perpetual ownership rights with characteristics 
mimicking both patents and copyrights runs counter to various prongs of the 
Intellectual Property Clause, including the “limited Times,” “Authors and 
Inventors,” and “Writings and Discoveries” requirements.10  Second, conferring 
perpetual property rights to states exempted under PASPA’s grandfathering 
provision violates the Intellectual Property Clause’s “limited Times” 
requirement.11  The focus of this paper is on the former. 
In a September 24, 1991 letter, the DOJ raised a number of concerns in 
connection with a then-Senate bill, S. 474, which would become PASPA.12  
Two concerns predominated.  First, the DOJ flagged a number of provisions in 
S. 474 that raised “federalism issues.”13  Second, the DOJ found it “particularly 
troubling that S. 474 would permit enforcement of its provisions by sports 
leagues.”14  The DOJ’s concerns were ignored. 
PASPA was enacted by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause.15  
However, the conferral of property rights under the straightforward language in 
section 3703 implicates the Intellectual Property Clause.16  When Congress 
granted ownership of “competitive game[s]” to the Sports Leagues as a 
mechanism to deputize the Sports Leagues for purposes of PASPA 
enforcement, such conferral took the functional form of a patent with ancillary 
characteristics common to a copyright.  This gave the Sports Leagues the right 
to exclude sports-wagering otherwise permissible under state law.17  By virtue 
 
7.  28 U.S.C. § 3703 (emphasis added). 
8.  See id.  
9.  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1352 (10th ed. 1993), available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/whose. 
10.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
11.  See id.  See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
12.  See Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 1991). 
13.  See id. 
14.  Id.  The federalism issues were at the center of the petitions for writ of certiorari in 
Christie.  The intellectual property implications were addressed in the amici curiae brief of the 
authors.  See Brief for Amici Curiae Ryan M. Rodenberg, Anastasios Kaburakis, and John T. 
Holden in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 4–22, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1246719 [hereinafter Brief for 
Amici Curiae Rodenberg, Kaburakis, & Holden]. 
15.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012). 
16.  See id. 
17.  The Supreme Court has provided an overview of the characteristics and remedies 
afforded to both patent and copyright holders.  See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
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of the language used in PASPA’s property rights conferral, the statute is within 
the purview of the Intellectual Property Clause and therefore must comply with 
the Clause’s express limitations. 
The Sports Leagues have cited the property rights granted by PASPA.18  
The Sports Leagues posit that they have a proprietary interest in “the degree to 
which others derive economic benefits from their own games . . . .”19  The 
Sports Leagues also contend that they “have an essential interest in how their 
games are perceived and the degree to which their sporting events become 
betting events.”20  The Sports Leagues further reference “legally protected 
interests of the organizations that produce the underlying games.”21  These 
recognitions of ownership by the Sports Leagues lend further support to a 
finding that PASPA implicates the Intellectual Property Clause. 
The Sports Leagues’ legal position on this point has also been supported by 
the DOJ in this case.22  The DOJ claimed “PASPA does give the leagues a 
protected legal interest that has been invaded by New Jersey’s authorization of 
sports gambling . . . .”23  The DOJ explained its argument by drawing an 
analogy to intellectual property law: “[T]he legal protection that PASPA 
accords to sports leagues is similar to the protections traditionally afforded in 
fields such as copyright and trademark law, where authors and companies are 
given the right not to have their creative works exploited by other parties.”24 
PASPA’s legislative history supports the arguments made by the Sports 
Leagues and the DOJ.  PASPA was debated in the Senate by the Subcommittee 
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks.25  The title of the statute itself reveals 
PASPA’s intent and effect.  PASPA stands for “Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act.”26  PASPA protects select professional and amateur 
sports leagues from the perceived ills of regulated sports-wagering through the 
allocation of ownership interests in “competitive game[s]” under section 
3703.27  Congress anointed the Sports Leagues to sue for injunctive relief under 
the statute in the same way patent holders and copyright holders can file suits to 
protect their property interests. 
When NBA commissioner David Stern testified in front of the Senate 
 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
18.  See Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-967), 2013 WL 2904907. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at 13–14. 
21.  Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint at 1, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 
2012) (No. 3:12-cv-4947), 2012 WL 4804067. 
22.  See Brief for Appellee United States of America at 17, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 13-1713, 13-1714, 13-1715) 2013 WL 
2904910. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Id. at 22 n.7. 
25.  See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991) 
[hereinafter Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling].   
26.  See 28 U.S.C. § 3701–04 (2012). 
27.  See id. § 3703. 
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Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks on June 26, 1991, he 
expressed his view on PASPA’s intended protection and on the overlap between 
sports-wagering and intellectual property: “Conducting a sports lottery or 
permitting sports gambling involves the use of professional sports leagues’ 
games, scores, statistics and team logos, in order to take advantage of a 
particular league’s popularity; such use violates, misappropriates and infringes 
upon numerous league property rights.”28 
Congress enacted patent and copyright laws pursuant to the Intellectual 
Property Clause.29  Patent law protection is granted for useful, novel, and non-
obvious inventions.30  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) reviews 
and grants patents.31  If approved, a patent permits the holder to exclude others 
from claiming the invention for a period of usually twenty years.32  Patents 
operate as a duly authorized monopoly for a limited duration of time.  The 
Sports Leagues did not obtain a formal patent from the USPTO in connection 
with individual sporting events.  Congress unilaterally granted a quasi-patent for 
sports-wagering purposes via the language contained in section 3703 of 
PASPA.33 
Copyright law protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed . . . .”34  Copyright 
categories are specifically enumerated and include literary works, musical 
recordings, and movies.35  Sporting events are not included in the inclusive 
list.36 
Congress’s conferral of ownership interests over athletic events to Sports 
Leagues functions as a monopoly and runs counter to Supreme Court 
precedent.37  In Sony v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,38 the Court explained: 
“The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited 
nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. . . . It is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors . . . .”39  PASPA fails to 
meet this standard in two ways.  First, PASPA’s ownership privileges under 
section 3703 attach to only “a professional sports organization or amateur sports 
organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of such 
violation.”40  Second, PASPA’s purpose is wholly unrelated to the creative 
activity of authors and inventors; instead, the statute seeks to control the spread 
 
28.  See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling, supra note 25, at 51 (testimony 
of David J. Stern, Comm’r, Nat’l Basketball Ass’n). 
29.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
30.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012). 
31.  See id. 
32.  See id. 
33.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012). 
34.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
35.  See id. 
36.  See id. 
37.  See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
38.  464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
39.  Id. at 429. 
40.  28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012). 
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 6 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/1
2014] “WHOSE” GAME IS IT? 5	
of an activity deemed by Congress to be undesirable.41 
With PASPA’s grant of a proprietary right to the Sports Leagues operating 
as the functional equivalent of a patent, it is useful to gauge the scope of 
Congress’s authority to grant patents.  In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas 
City,42 the Court made clear: 
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are 
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict 
free access to materials already available.  Innovation, advancement, 
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent 
requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must 
“promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”  This is the standard 
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.43 
When juxtaposed with the Intellectual Property Clause’s requirements, 
PASPA’s grant of a patent-like property right to Sports Leagues fails on 
multiple counts.  First, the power to exclude states from effectuating regulated 
sports-wagering programs is unrelated to, and in direct conflict with, the 
Intellectual Property Clause’s requirement that such grants “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”44  Scholars Paul Heald and Suzanna 
Sherry have noted, “[a] corollary principle [of the Intellectual Property Clause] 
demands that Congress initially direct exclusive grants to those who provide the 
public with the new creation.  Monopolies are not rewards Congress may grant 
to favored special-interest groups.”45 
Second, PASPA’s grant of property rights is perpetual, putting it at odds 
with the “limited Times” requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause.46  
Third, as detailed in National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.,47 the Sports 
Leagues do not qualify as “Authors” under the Intellectual Property Clause.48  
The Second Circuit in Motorola ruled against the NBA and found the league’s 
primary business was “producing basketball games with live attendance and 
licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those games . . . .”49  Fourth, athletic events 
do not constitute “Writings [or] Discoveries” under the Intellectual Property 
Clause, given their purported spontaneous nature and accompanying uncertainty 
of outcome.50 
PASPA’s grant of copyright-like power to the Sports Leagues is equally 
 
41.  See id. 
42.  383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
43.  Id. at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
44.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
45.  Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1119, 1164 (2000). 
46.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
47.  105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
48.  See id. 
49.  Id. at 853. 
50.  In contrast to scripted television shows or quasi-sporting events such as 
professional wrestling, the Sports Leagues supposedly do not participate in athletic events 
using pre-arranged scripts or a rehearsed sequencing of game-level events.   
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evident under section 3703’s “whose competitive game” language.51  In their 
original complaint, the Sports Leagues posited that athletic contests are not 
scripted, implicating the “Writings” requirement of the Intellectual Property 
Clause and the “fixation” language in the Copyright Act of 1976.52  The Sports 
Leagues argued that “the outcomes of collegiate and professional athletic 
contests must be determined, and must be perceived by the public as being 
determined, solely on the basis of honest athletic competition.”53  Unlike live 
musicals, theatrical plays, and professional wrestling, honestly competitive 
sports are unscripted, making them incompatible with copyright law’s 
constitutional and statutory requirements. 
Unlike the games’ telecasts and broadcasts, which have been found to be 
copyrightable content, the games per se have not been definitively deemed 
worthy of copyright protection.54  Indeed, as the Solicitor General recently 
explained as amicus in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.55: “In some 
circumstances, moreover, the initial ‘performance’ may be the act of 
transmission itself.  For example, when a television network broadcasts a live 
sporting event, no underlying performance precedes the initial transmission—
the telecast itself is the only copyrighted work.”56  Additionally, the “whose 
competitive game” wording of section 3703 creates the suspicion of a sui 
generis Intellectual Property Clause violation by basing a property right granted 
by PASPA to a concept that has no owner.57 
PASPA’s conferral of property rights in section 3703 also highlights a 
conflict between the Commerce Clause and the Intellectual Property Clause.58  
According to professor Thomas Nachbar, “[t]he overwhelming view among 
commentators is that the Intellectual Property Clause’s limits apply to all of 
Congress’s powers and therefore that Congress may not look to other Article I, 
Section 8 powers in order to avoid those limits.”59  The implications for the 
Intellectual Property Clause’s external limitations on PASPA are profound.  
Scholar Jeanne Fromer flags the issue generally as follows: “Since the late 
twentieth century, Congress has increasingly reached beyond the [Intellectual 
Property] Clause’s means to promote the [Intellectual Property] Clause’s ends, 
 
51.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012).   
52.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, supra note 4.  
53.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4, at ¶ 5. 
54.  This issue has emerged as both an inter-circuit split as well as an intra-circuit split 
within the Eighth Circuit.  The Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit are largely at odds.  
Compare Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), with Morris 
Commc’ns. Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004).  The Eighth Circuit 
cases include Nat’l Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) 
and C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d. 
818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
55.  134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
56.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am. 
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079. 
57.  See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012). 
58.  See id.  
59.  Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 272, 274 (2004). 
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 6 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/1
2014] “WHOSE” GAME IS IT? 7	
often asserting its expansive—and less limited—commerce and treaty 
powers.”60 
PASPA’s invocation of the Intellectual Property Clause is a novel 
argument, one not addressed by the parties or other amici in the Christie 
litigation.61  The other parties have focused their attention on anti-
commandeering principles contained within the Tenth Amendment and 
arguments related to equal sovereignty.62  PASPA’s deputization of Sports 
Leagues and embedded property rights to “competitive game[s]” under section 
3703 have not been uniformly accepted in various federal courts.63  In addition 
to the obvious First Amendment issues connected to the commodification of 
news from sporting events, the judicial divergence on this issue yields 
substantial doubt in regard to PASPA’s underpinnings and compatibility with 
the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause. 
 
 
60.  Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1329, 1330 (2012) (emphasis omitted). 
61.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation 
and Cato Institute in Support of Petitioners, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. 
Ct. 2866 (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1089088; Brief for Amici Curiae Rodenberg, Kaburakis, & 
Holden, supra note 14; Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming in Support of Petitioners, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 
2866 (2014) (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1089089. 
62.  See supra note 61. 
63.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4.  
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